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ABSTRACT
Although the Defender consumer model, as proposed by Hauser and Shugan
(1983), has proved useful in defensive situations where only one firm
adjusts its price in response to an entrant, many authors have criticized
the two-firm analysis, proposing instead an n-firm Nash equilibrium in
prices. This note provides a formal proof that such an equilibrium exists
and is unique when the consumer taste distribution is rectangular (uniform).
We assume that each firm has one brand and that n>l brands are located
in perceptual space at positions (xi, yi) for i = 1,2, ... , n. We assume no
firms are located at identical positions. A priori, we do not require that
these brands be positioned efficiently, but it is clear that if a Nash
equilibrium exists with positive profits, the resulting equilibrium will
contain only efficient brands. Furthermore, we do allow firms to consider
prices that would cause competitors to be priced out of the market.
Let be the vector of prices. We consider the Nash price game where
each firm seeks unilaterally to maximize its own profit. The resulting
equilibrium, if it exists, is the fixed point where each firm's Nash price
(Pi*) is its best response to every other firm playing its Nash price.
Following Hauser and Shugan (1983), hereafter denoted H&S, the Defender
profit functions, i(p), for uniformly distributed tastes, are given by:
ii +
i(p) = (pi -c)N f(a)da = (pi-c) (ai - a) (ii-)
where aij = arc tan rij and rij = (xj/pj - xi/Pi)/(yi/Pi - j/Pj). We have
set the market size, N = /2 for convenience. The notations i+ and i-
indicate the next efficient brands along the efficient frontier. Depending
on whether or not a brand is priced out of the market, the identity of the
j- and j+ brands may change. Note that costs, c, are assumed to be
independent of volume.
Finally, we endow each consumer with a finite reservation price. Thus,
at a price beyond this maximum reservation price, a firm can expect zero
sales and zero profit. This assures the strategy space is compact. We
assume, of course, that the reservation price is above the firms' marginal
production costs.
Lemma 1. The Defender profit function is continuous and quasi-concave in
price. It is strictly quasi-concave on the range where it takes on positive
values.
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Proof: For this lemma and the next lemma, the brands other than j are fixed
in position and price. Thus, for a given Pi, let h, i, j, and k denote four
adjacent brands in counter-clockwise order around the efficient frontier.
(When there are not four such brands use the 0,- boundary definitions of
H&S, page 328.) Let (') denote the first derivative with respect to Pi, and
(") denote the second derivative.
Assume temporarily that h and j are not priced out of the market. We
note that i(p) > 0 whenever Pi > c since ij > ahi. Furthermore, when Pi >
c and Pi is less than the reservation price, i(p) > 0 whenever aij > hi-
Differentiating equation (1) we get 'i(p) = (i-c)(a'i-ahi )+(ij-ahi)
and iH"() = (Pi - c)(aij-ahi) + 2(aij ahi) = i(P ic a ' 2
+ [-(Pi-C)ahi- 2ai] -- A i + Bi.
Then by direct but tedious computation, we obtain:
Ai = 2 [(xiyj - xjYi)/pipj] (yj/pj - Yi/Pi) [xi/Pi ' (c/Pi)(xj/Pj)] *
Pi [(Yj/Pj - Yi/Pi)2 + (xi/pi - xj/pj) 2]2
Yi/Pi (C/Pi)(Yj/Pj) rij
xi/Pi (c/Pi)(xj/Pj) (2)
Bi = ( 2[(xhYi-XiYh)/PhPi (xh/Ph - xi/Pi) [Yi/Pi ' (c/Pi)(Yh/Ph)] .
Pi [(Yi/Pi - Yh/Ph)2 + (xh/Ph - xi/Pi)2]2
xi/Pi - (c/Pi)(xh/Ph) _ 1
Yi/Pi - (c/Pi)(Yh/Ph) rhi (3)
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For adjacent brands, yj/pj > Yi/Pi and xi/Pi > xj/pj, hence the first
term in large brackets is positive for Ai whenever Pi > c. Similarly, the
first term in large brackets is positive for Bi. Thus l'(p) will be
negative whenever rij is sufficiently large and rhi is sufficiently small.
(The first term in each of the second brackets does not depend on Pi; it
cancels.) As Pi diminishes, aij increases toward T/2 (H&S lemma 1), hence
rij increases toward infinity. Thus the second bracket in Ai becomes
negative. Similarly as Pi diminishes, ahi diminishes toward 0, and l/rhi
increases toward infinity. Thus, for small Pi > c, IIi(p) is strictly
concave as long as it remains positive and h and j are not priced out of the
market. Note that H1i(p) is continuous on this range.
As Pi diminishes, it may happen that either h or j is priced out of the
market. Without loss of generality, assume it is j. In this case there is
either no new upper adjacent brand, that is, j is the last efficient brand,
or k is the new upper adjacent brand. If there is no new upper adjacent
brand, aij remains at /2 and Ai becomes linear in Pi, preserving concavity.
If k is the new upper adjacent brand, then rij = rik at the price pc,
where j is first under cut, i.e., priced out of the market. Thus, Ai is
continuous at this point. Further, since Yk/Pk > Yi/Pi and Xi/Pi > xk/Pk,
UC
Ai remains negative. Finally, for Pi < ic , it is clear that aik < aij;
hence, j(p) "kinks the right way" to preserve concavity. See figure 1.
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FIGURE 1. The relationship of c.ij and cik when j is
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priced out of the market (Pi < i )
1
So far, we have shown that i(P) is concave for Pi between c and i,
1
the price where Ai or Bi first becomes zero. For i > pi, rij and
i
l/rhi both diminish. Thus, either an inflection point, Pi = Pi is reached
before the reservation price or it is not. If it is not reached, i(p) is
concave between c and the reservation price. If it is reached, then for
1
Pi > Pi, rij and rhi diminish further and "(p) will remain positive.
Thus i(2) has at most one inflection point. Finally, beyond some price,
pu, i() = 0, because either i is no longer efficient or it exceeds the
reservation price. (Note that brand i eventually becomes inefficient in all
cases except n=2 and the only competitor is on an axis. Hence, we only need
the reservation price assumption in this special case.) Because Tli(p) has
at most one inflection point and 7i(-) = 0, the maximum of i(p) must occur
i hmax i
below i. That is, i < i.
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Putting the arguments for small and large Pi together assures that
ji(p), is continuous and strictly quasi-concave whenever ni(p) > 0. Finally,
for Pi < c, equation 1 is negative and the firm will choose not to enter the
market. Hence, Li(p) = 0 for Pi < c. Thus, i(p) is continuous and quasi-
concave for all Pi'
Figure 2 illustrates the Defender profit function.
FIGURE 2. Quasi-concave Defender profit function. (uc is the price at
which i undercuts j. pmax is the price wherei(.p) obtains its
maximum. pi is the inflection point. And, p is the price




1 1 2Corollary 1. Let S = [c,Pi] and Si= {Pil i(P) > O}, then the
Defender profit function is concave on the connected set, Si Si n S i
1 max
Proof. The result is obvious by the definitions of Pi and pi and the
2proof to Lemma 1. Note that S i and hence Si is a connected set. If
Si is empty, brand i chooses not to enter the market.
Lemma 2. Let H be the Hessian of the Defender profit function. Then, H is
negative quasi-definite, whenever Pi Si for all i.
Proof. To show H negative quasi-definite, we need to show that H + Ht is
negative definite. (A Hessian is the matrix of second partial and cross-
partial derivatives.) Equations (2) and (3) give us the second partial
derivatives. By direct computation we obtain the cross partial derivatives:
a2ni() = -piAi + Pi * -(c/pi2 ) [(xiYj - xjYi)/PiPj]
apiapj Pj Pj (Yj/Pj - Yi/Pi)2 + (xi/pi - xj/pj) 2
(Pi/Pj) * (-Ai + Wi) (4)
Note that Wi < 0. Similarly, we show a2 ni(p)/api3Pn = (Pn/Pi)*(-Bi+Zi)
where Zi has a definition analogous to equation (4).
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At any p, i(p) depends on at most the lower and upper adjacent brands,
h and j, where adjacency is defined relative to p. Thus, for a given p, the
i-jth rows of H are given by:
0 (Ph/Pi)(-Bi+Zi) (Ai+Bi) (pi/Pj)(-Ai+Wi) 0 0
O o (pj/pi)(-Bj+Zj) (Aj + Bj) (pj/Pk)(-Aj+Wj) 0
Since the determinants of all principal minors of H are invariant if we
multiply the i-jth element by (j/Pi) and the j-ith element by (Pi/Pj), H is
negative quasi-definite if the following matrix is negative quasi-definite:
0 (-Bi + Zi) ( A i + Bi) (-Ai + W i) 0 0 ...
o 0 (-Bj + Zj) ( Aj + Bj) (-Aj + Wj) 0 ...
H + Ht is symmetric and H is negative quasi-definite if -H is positive
quasi-definite. Hence, by Murata (1977, Theorem 38) H is negative quasi-
definite if the rows of the above matrix have negative dominant diagonals
(n.d.d.), that is, if IAi + Bil > -Bi + Zil + I-Ai+Wil for all i. Since
Ai and Bi are of the same sign, both negative, we need only show that
IAil > I-Ai + Wil and IBil > I-Bi + il. We focus on the former inequality
since the latter then follows by symmetry.
By algebraic expansion and simplification we obtain the following
conditions where = 3/(4 - c/pi).
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Pi E Si if rij > Yi/Pi (c/Pi) (Yj/Pj) (C)
Xi/P i - (C/Pi) (xj/pj)
-Ai + Wi < 0 if rij < Yi/Pi (c/pi)(Yi/Pi+Yj/Pj)/2 (I)
xi/Pi - (c/Pi)(xi/pi+xj/pj)/2
-2Ai + Wi > 0 if rij > Yi/Pi '- (c/Pi) (Yj/Pj) (II)
Xi/Pi - (c/Pi) (xj/pj)
3(-2Ai+Wi)/ac > 0 if rij < Yi/Pi + 3 yj/pj (III)
xi/Pi + 3 xj/pj
a(-Ai+Wi)/ac < 0 if rij > Yi/Pi + Yj/Pj (IV)
xi/pi + xj/pj
We can also show by direct algebra that condition I implies condition III.
Either -Ai + Wi > 0 or -Ai + Wi < O. Suppose the former. Then
I-Ai + Wil = -Ai + Wi < -Ai = Ail, since Ai < 0 on Si and Wi < 0.
Suppose the latter. Then I-Ai + Wil = Ai - W i and condition I holds.
N.d.d. holds if Ai - Wi < -Ai, that is, if -2Ai + Wi > 0. Since condition I
implies condition III, if -2Ai + Wi > 0 for some c, -2Ai + Wi > 0 for all c
> c°, such that condition I holds.
There are now two subcases either condition IV holds or it does not.
Note that condition IV is independent of c. If condition IV holds, -Ai + Xi
is decreasing in c and the smallest c for which -Ai + Wi < 0 is c such that
Wi = Ai. But at Wi = Ai, -2Ai + Wi = -Ai > O. Thus if condition IV holds,
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IAil > I-Ai + Wil. If condition IV does not hold, -Ai+W i is increasing in c
and the region where -Ai+Wi < 0 is between c=O and c=c° such that Wi=Ai. By
the above agruments, -2Ai + Wi O0 at c and by condition II, -2Ai + Wi O0
at c=O since condition II and condition C are identical at c=O. Thus, if
condition IV does not hold, IAil > I-Ai + Wil.
This exhausts the conditions hence IAil 1 I-Ai + Wil and by the above
arguments H is negative quasi-definite whenever Pi Si for all i.
Theorem. A Nash equilibrium to the Defender price game, with a rectangular
taste distribution, exists, and when c > O, it is unique.
Proof. Existence follows immediately from lemma 1 and Friedman's (1977,
p.153) Theorem 7.1. That is, (1) the number of brands, n, is finite; (2) the
strategy space is compact because Pi is bounded between c and the reserva-
tion price; (3) the Defender profit function is continuous and bounded from
above by (pi-c), and (4) it is strictly quasi-concave whenever Hi(p) > 0.
For uniqueness we recognize that in a Nash equilibrium no brand
would consider a price, Pi, greater than pi since max< Nor would
would consider a price, Pi, greater than Pi since Pi Pi Nor would
it consider a price less than cost. Thus we restrict ourselves to Pi Si
for all i. Uniqueness then follows from Rosen's (1965) Theorems 4 and 6
since i(P) is concave and the Hessian is negative quasi-definite for
R c S - S1 x S2 x ... x Sn. (An alternative proof to existence follows from
Rosen's (1965) Theorem 1 when p S.)
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Note that in the equilibria of the theorem brands with poor positions,
(xi,yi), may find i(P) < 0 for all potential prices. Such brands will
choose not to enter the market.
Positive costs, c>O, are necessary for uniqueness. For c=O, equation
(4) implies that Wi = Zi = 0 and the Hessian becomes singular. In this
case, p* is unique only up to a positive scalar.
In additon to the existence and uniqueness theorem, our lemmas enable
us to generalize a few of the H&S results. For example, we note that H&S
stated their Defensive Pricing Theorem (p.334) as a marginal result. That
is, for their two-firm analysis they stated that defensive profits could be
increased by decreasing price. They did not rule out cases where such a
move leads to a local maximum. Since lemma 1 implies strict quasi-concavity,
the only maximum is a global maximum, hence, given the two-firm analysis,
defensive price decreases are always more profitable than price increases
when tastes are rectangular.
We also note that H&S's definition of regularity, xi/yi rij, implies
condition C, hence j(p) is concave if the market is regular.
Finally, we note that our theorem can be used to examine the H&S re-
sults for the case where: (1) a market is in equilibrium before entry; (2) a
surprise entry occurs; and (3) the market seeks an equilibrium after entry.
We have not obtained analytical results for this case, but the existence and
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